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Abstract 
The paper considers the influence of the budget for military spending in the Soviet 
command economy. A specific problem is that the Soviet strategy of concealment left 
us without good measures of the military burden on Soviet resources. The paper 
surveys previous western attempts to fill this gap alongside post–Brezhnev 
revelations. A new documentary source from 1982 that appears authoritative suggests 
much higher figures than anything proposed or revealed so far, and supports these 
higher figures in detail. However, the figures contain many puzzles and the 
authenticity of the document itself cannot be fully assured. 
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Introduction 
The breadth and depth of disagreements aroused in the last quarter of the twentieth 
century when independent scholars and western government agencies attempted to 
measure the size of the Soviet economy was remarkable. Similar disagreements beset 
the attempts of the time to grasp the scale of the Soviet military burden.  
In this paper I present and consider the evidence of a new source relating to the 
level and composition of Soviet military outlays in rubles under the tenth five–year 
plan of 1976 to 1980. The evidence is apparently authoritative, and the figures are 
much larger than any that have been independently estimated or officially revealed.  
To set the context I proceed as follows. Part 1 discusses the role of budget outlays 
including defence appropriations in the Soviet planned economy and how military 
spending may have affected economic performance and stability. Part 2 outlines the 
range of existing estimates of Soviet defence outlays and explains briefly the basis for 
divergent estimates. Part 3 summarises the documentary character of the new source 
and evaluates its possible authenticity. Part 4 seeks to interpret its internal puzzles. 
Part 5 considers its use for measuring the Soviet military burden. Part 6 concludes. 
1. The Role of the Military Budget 
1.1. The Overall Allocation of Resources 
The Soviet military budget was of significance in two aspects. First, it provided for 
the maintenance of the USSR’s armed forces and the accumulation of its military 
stocks. From this point of view the importance of the military budget was that it 
provided the inputs that helped to promote the place of the Soviet Union in the 
international military balance. Second, the military budget served to extract the 
necessary resources for this from the Soviet economy and consequently had a major 
influence on the allocation of Soviet resources; because there was a trade–off 
between military and civilian uses of resources the military budget represented a 
burden that adversely affected civilian outcomes including living standards and 
economic growth. The character of the information provided in this paper is such that 
it provides no further insight into the former aspect of the international military 
balance and throws light exclusively on the latter aspect, the issue of the military 
burden on the Soviet economy. 
The Soviet Union is often said to have had a planned economy and that detailed 
supply plans denominated in physical units fixed the allocation of real resources to 
final uses from above. It is not necessarily obvious what role budgetary assignments 
in rubles could have played in such a system.1 In fact, the financial resources assigned 
through the state budget were very important in allocating real resources to final uses, 
and the more we find out about the inner working of the Soviet regime the more 
important these appear to have been. For example, it seems that Stalin and his 
immediate associates gave much more time and energy to determining the appropriate 
magnitudes of the annual budgets for civilian construction and military procurements 
than to cursory approval of the “control figures” for material supply plans.2 
                                                     
1 For classic studies of the working of the Soviet budgetary and financial system 
see Davies (1958) and Garvy (1977). 
2 Davies (2001); Gregory (2001); Davies, Ilič, and Khlevniuk (2002); Gregory 
(2002). 
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The importance of budget allocations appears to have been a direct result of the 
inability of centralised supply planning to determine final uses. This was for two 
reasons, first, because some products did not have a determinate intermediate or final 
use, and second, because centralised plans were insufficiently detailed to link 
products to intermediate or final users.  
As far as the first point is concerned, consider the civilian economy as comprising 
three sectors of origin. These produced (1) specialised consumables: goods and 
services that could not be used except for consumption, for example food, clothing, 
and entertainment (2) general–purpose goods and services that could be used equally 
in production and consumption: industrial and building materials, fuel and power 
supplies, transport services, information and communications equipment, light 
automobiles and parts, electrical components and fittings, furniture, office supplies, 
and stationery, and (3) specialised machinery: industrial and military equipment, 
often produced in the same industrial facilities, that could only be used in production 
or the defence sector. From this it is apparent that supply planning was only the 
beginning of the allocation of resources. Once plans had fixed shares in output by 
sector of origin, a competitive struggle ensued in which households and the armed 
forces fought over the distribution of consumables; in the distribution of general–
purpose goods and services the contestants were households, firms, and the armed 
forces; and firms and the armed forces contested the distribution of machinery. In 
brief the competing users of each class of product were as shown below: 
 
By households: 
for final 
consumption 
and household 
inventories 
By firms: for 
intermediate 
consumption, 
inventories, 
and fixed 
investment 
By the Armed 
Forces: for 
consumption 
and military 
inventories 
Class of Product:    
Specialised Consumables ×  × 
General–Purpose Products × × × 
Specialised Machinery  × × 
Thus supply plans for output, although more detailed than suggested by this 
simple example, were not sufficient to allocate resources among final uses. Budget 
allocations to investment and military purchases closed the system, fixing civilian 
consumption as a residual as follows. Households were able to consume the output of 
consumables not claimed for military services, plus the output of general purpose 
goods not claimed for production by producers of consumables and machinery or for 
investment or for military services. Therefore, holding the military and investment 
budgets equal, civilian consumption rose with the supply of each sector, including 
even specialised machinery; controlling  for supply, however, civilian consumption 
fell as the military and investment budgets rose. (For formal treatment see Appendix 
1, proposition 1.) In turn the military and investment budgets could be traded off 
against each other ruble for ruble. 
A corollary governs the allocation of resources to the pay of conscripts. The pay 
of workers was determined differently in different activities. Given the relative 
freedom of the postwar Soviet labour market firms had to retain civilian workers by 
paying them their reservation wage. The armed forces, in contrast, relied on 
conscripts who were retained by fear of the penalties for desertion; consequently, the 
pay of conscripts was much lower. However, soldiers’ wages were not determined 
completely arbitrarily. In fact, the condition of an equilibrium in the general market 
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for consumer goods, or less stringently the requirement to control the extent of 
disequilibrium, imposed a limit on what the authorities could pay. The maximum 
conscript wage was positively associated with supply plans of the three civilian 
sectors but negatively associated with budgetary demands, with the civilian 
reservation wage, and with the labour intensity of military services output. At first 
sight it might appear that a more generous budgetary allocation to defence would 
allow conscripts to be paid more, not less; controlling for other factors, however, the 
result would be a lower equilibrium wage since higher military spending would 
reduce, not increase the resources available for consumption generally; higher 
conscript wages would result only in soldiers receiving more tickets of lower 
expected value in the lottery of the retail market (see Appendix 1, proposition 2). 
This story may overstate the importance of budget appropriations in determining 
real resource allocation. The reason is that some sectors of the Soviet economy 
displayed considerable price flexibility; as a result, an increased budget for capital 
construction or defence might result in faster inflation rather than greater real 
investment activity.3 In the case of defence enlarged budgets were not always spent, 
perhaps for this reason.4 
1.2. Long–Run Performance 
In considering the rise and fall of great powers Paul Kennedy concluded that 
excessive military spending typically leads to economic decline.5 In the case of the 
Soviet Union it is often suggested that military–economic competition with the 
United States helped to destabilise the economy at the end of the 1980s.  
In contrast to historical writing, economic investigations of the possible long–run 
consequences of peacetime military spending have often tended to remain 
unimpressed, at least as far as market economies as concerned. Various studies have 
identified a growth–defence relationship across countries that is weakly positive, 
weakly negative, or with a sign dependent on income level, or not significant at all.6  
Two reasons for the lack of strong results suggest themselves, even within a 
highly simplified framework. First, the share of defence spending may be increased at 
the expense of household consumption, not investment, so that the long–run growth 
of the economy is unaffected and, after the adjustment, living standards also rise at 
the same rate as before but at a level that is permanently lower by the amount of the 
initial sacrifice. This case is illustrated in figure 1. Second, to the extent that defence 
spending takes resources away from investment the country’s economic growth will 
decelerate but the deceleration should be temporary; once the capital stock has 
adjusted to a smaller size its increased marginal productivity should mean that it will 
resume growth at the same rate as before. Figure 2 illustrates this case on the basis of 
standard assumptions about diminishing returns and technical progress. In short, an 
increase in the share of defence may permanently affect the levels of consumption 
and perhaps also total output but, once stabilised, the level of defence spending 
should have no persistent effect on their growth. 
                                                     
3 For examples see Davies (2001), and for microfoundations Harrison and Kim 
(2001).  
4 Gregory (2002). 
5 Kennedy (1988). 
6 Evidence from the postwar period is summarised by Landau (1993) and 
Anderton (1993), 96–98. Easterly and Fischer (1995), 347–8, confirm Landau’s result 
of an inverse U–shaped relationship: for low levels of defence expenditure, growth 
rises as defence expenditure rises, but then falls back at higher levels. On the interwar 
period see Eloranta (2002). 
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Figure 1. Effects of Raising the Military Burden at the Expense of Consumption 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Effects of Raising the Military Burden at the Expense of Investment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Such a simplified approach may be criticised in various ways. For one thing the 
Soviet economy was not a market economy; its peculiar institutions may have 
constrained its choices more rigidly than the above would imply. Specifically, if the 
Soviet economy found it harder to substitute capital for labour than a market 
economy, then growth might only be maintained by continuous increases in the 
investment share and a given defence share might impose a constraint on growth that 
binds more and more tightly through time.7 
More interesting insights into the implications of military spending may arise 
from an arms race model of the type proposed by Murray Wolfson.8 The spirit of this 
approach is illustrated in figure 3. The right hand side of the figure shows Soviet 
production possibilities: total output could be allocated to military uses on the vertical 
axis, or to investment and consumption on the right–hand horizontal axis so the 
downward sloping 45o line represents an aggregate supply constraint. On the demand 
side suppose that the Soviet economy faced a minimum investment requirement to 
replace the capital stock, a minimum consumption level to maintain loyalty and effort 
on the part of the population, and a minimum level of military force required to deter 
attack. In figure 3 the combined sum of minimum requirements for investment and 
consumption is represented on the right–hand horizontal axis by a vertical line at z1. 
                                                     
7 On Soviet capital labour substitution see Kontorovich (1988) and on the 
significance of Soviet defence outlays in an econometric framework Easterly and 
Fischer (1995). 
8 Wolfson (1985). 
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Think of each requirement dynamically. Soviet economic growth meant the capital 
stock was growing and with it the minimum investment requirement for replacement. 
Continually increasing skills and human capital were also pushing upward the 
population’s reservation wage. Through time, therefore, z1 moved rightwards at a rate 
similar to that of the production frontier. 
Figure 3. Effects of the Arms Race on Soviet Economic Stability 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The demand for military spending is represented on the left hand side of figure 3: 
United States military spending fixed the Soviet requirement for minimum 
deterrence. If US military spending was x1 the matching requirement for Soviet 
military outlays was y1. When y1 is combined with z1, the total of minimum 
requirements is within Soviet production possibilities at A with something left in 
reserve. But US economic growth meant that US military spending was rising. Thus, 
x1 was moving to the right, driving y1 upwards. 
Suppose the Soviet steady–state growth rate of total output fell below that of the 
US economy. Then the military outlays required for minimum deterrence would rise 
faster than the production frontier could expand, implying a steadily rising military 
burden on Soviet GDP. Suppose US military spending rose to x2; so that the matching 
requirement for Soviet military outlays rose to y2. When y2 is combined with z1, the 
total of minimum requirements falls outside Soviet production possibilities at B: 
demand exceeds supply. One of the constraints must give. To breach the investment 
constraint would trigger declining capacity and a vicious circle of collapsing output; 
to violate the fair wage constraint would lead to defection of the population; or the 
Soviet military would no longer deploy sufficient resources to deter attack. 
In hindsight this class of model seems to support a plausible interpretation of the 
Soviet economic collapse that highlights the role of the military burden. On closer 
inspection it becomes less attractive. For one thing in other historical cases the 
constraints on which it relies have rarely been found to be either sharply defined or 
absolutely binding. Rather, there are usually very broad zones of gradually increasing 
violation.9 For another thing Gorbachev, keenly aware of the military burden, scaled 
                                                     
9 Germany in World War II illustrates the point. Between 1941 and 1944 despite 
intense aerial bombardment and civilian belt–tightening the German economy not 
only tripled its war production but also carried out new industrial investment on a 
Soviet Military Outlays, y 
A
B
y1 
y2 
US Military 
Outlays, x 
Soviet Outlays on
Investment and
Consumption, z
x1 x2 z1 
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down the Soviet concept of minimum deterrence in the late 1980s in the name of 
“new thinking” so as to leave more room for investment and consumption. Rather 
than violate the investment and consumption constraints, he permitted the military 
constraint to give way. Despite this the Soviet economy began to collapse in 1990. So 
the timing of the historical events does not seem to fit the theoretical model. 
In summary there are various reasons to suppose that the Soviet military burden 
was associated with slow growth, or with declining growth, or even with ultimate 
Soviet collapse: so far so good. But the reasoning is often speculative; it does not find 
very detailed or firm support in the evidence. There are more good reasons to 
discount the influence of the military factor on growth, slowdown, or collapse, than is 
often supposed. We suppose it must have mattered but we are still not sure how. 
2. The Range of Estimates 
1.1. Official Figures 
In the 1970s and early 1980s the State Budget adopted each year by the USSR 
Supreme Soviet assigned to defence a sum of never less than 17 or more than 18 
billion rubles annually. Since the nominal value of the USSR’s net material product 
in those years was measured in hundreds of billions, the military burden implied by 
the official budget measure was trivial. In 1980, for example, it was no more than 3.8 
per cent of the net material product, or 2.8 per cent when the Soviet national income 
was recalculated on a western goods–and–services or GNP basis. Since the nominal 
value of the USSR’s net material product was rising while the official budgetary 
allocation to defence stood still, the officially admitted military burden was not only 
trivial but also falling. On both counts it was a transparent lie. 
This had not always been the case. In the 1920s and 1930s Soviet figures for 
defence spending were mostly truthful. The archives have revealed one exception: 
published military budgets were directly falsified and understated in the period from 
1931 to 1933 in order to influence the Geneva disarmament negotiations; the deceit 
was carried on in 1934 and 1935 so as to smooth the transition back to relatively 
truthful accounts in 1936.10 Thus for several years there were two sets of defense 
accounts, one for consumption by both the public and the broad mass of less 
privileged officials, and another for the Politburo alone which showed the true state 
of affairs. Defence budgets were concealed during World War II but were revealed 
soon after with relative truthfulness, although minimally so with regard to the support 
of military spending by Lend–Lease.11 The published Soviet budget continued to tell 
the truth after the war and into the 1950s. But by the 1960s official releases and the 
truth had parted company again and this was no mere trial separation but a lasting 
divorce. There was no attempt at reconciliation until a whole generation had passed 
and glasnost’ (“transparency”) intervened, first in 1987 and again in 1989; even then, 
it has been suggested, the truth was incompletely revealed.12 
                                                                                                                                           
scale that exceeded the destruction of manufacturing facilities from the air 
(Abelshauser, 1998). That civilian loyalties and the civilian infrastructure remained 
intact is testimony partly to the power of German nationalism and hatred or fear of 
the enemy, partly to the power of substitution processes to enable people to get by in 
wartime without that which was formerly defined as “essential”. The German 
economy collapsed in early 1945 only after years of military attrition; economic 
warfare contributed but was not the primary factor. See further Overy (1994). 
10 Davies (1997); Davies and Harrison (1997). 
11 Plotnikov (1945); Voznesenskii (1947); Bergson (1948); on Lend–Lease see 
Harrison (1996). 
12 Cooper (1998) surveys trends since 1987. 
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The motive of postwar deception was apparently the same as in 1931, that is, to 
influence the climate of arms control and armament negotiations. The explanation 
offered recently by Iurii Masliukov and Evgenii Glubokov confirms this: 
In 1963 the USSR unilaterally cut [its] allocations to the armed forces to show 
good will and the USA also made some cuts, but the West did not support the 
1964 proposal to cut military budgets by 10 to 15 per cent. The USSR made 
proposals to cut military allocations successively in 1973, 1976, 1978, 1980, 
1982, 1983, 1984, and 1987. At the same time the necessity of providing for 
strategic parity in the arms race that was imposed on us, and of improvement of 
the technical level of armament and military equipment, demanded further 
development of the defence complex and growth of the volume of finance. 
Therefore defence spending in real terms rose and peaked in 1988–89. In 1989 it 
amounted to 77 294.2 million rubles (16.1 per cent of the overall budget of the 
country).13 
This statement implies directly that the falsification of the official budget series for 
defence began after or in 1963. However, the new figure for defence spending in 
1960 that Masliukov and Glubokov then revealed, 15.3 billion rubles, is more than 50 
per cent larger than the official budget figure for that year, 9.3 billions. Since a gap of 
this magnitude cannot have been created quickly, it follows that the deception 
actually began some years before 1960.  
Masliukov and Glubokov also indicate the accounting methodology of deception: 
outlays on the procurement of weapons and military equipment, and also allocations 
to military R&D, were transferred to budget spending for finance and development of 
the national economy (i.e. to current subsidies plus capital investments). Implicitly, 
then, official budget spending on defence comprised mainly outlays on current 
operations and maintenance of the armed forces. The method of accounting for 
military construction is not indicated. Finally, Masliukov and Glubokov list a number 
of items of potential or actual military application that would be excluded from the 
defence accounts of most countries such as administrative costs of the defence 
complex, the maintenance of a number of research institutes and colleges, fixed 
investments in the defence industry, and investments in industrial mobilisation 
inventories, together making up to 15 billion rubles in 1989.14 
Even on a narrow definition of military spending, however, speculation that the 
new figures of 1989 were not fully inclusive began already not long after their first 
release.15 Such speculation was encouraged by the fact that much higher figures for 
overall “narrow” defence spending and with quasi–official authority had long been in 
circulation in the West, some provided by defectors and others obtained by 
intelligence means. Called the “benchmark data” by William T. Lee, a former 
                                                     
13 Masliukov and Glubokov (1999), 105. Glubokov is a former member and 
Masliukov a former chief of the VPK of the USSR Council of Ministers; Masliukov 
also formerly headed USSR Gosplan. 
14 Masliukov and Glubokov (1999), 106. The authors state that the extra items left 
out of the defence budget on a 1989 basis would have raised military spending in that 
year to 10 per cent of GNP. They give the defence budget in that year as 8.6 per cent 
of GNP and GNP as 924.1 billion rubles, from which 924.1 × (10% – 8.6%) = 14.8 
billions approximately. 
15 For a survey that includes the role played by western experts in auditing and 
validating the new figures see Masliukov and Glubokov (1999), 109–14. 
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employee, then critic of the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), these 
figures are as follows:16 
1970  50 billion rubles 
1972  approximately 58 billion rubles 
1980 approximately 100 billion rubles 
1982  more than 150 billion rubles. 
To these may be added a figure for 1990 supplied by Soviet economic journalists of 
“more than 200 billion rubles”.17 
However, when the late Dmitri Steinberg consulted with Goskomstat officials 
and former defence industry managers in Moscow 1990/91 on the subject of “hidden” 
defence industry costs, including both budgetary items not counted under the 
Ministry of Defence allocation and other resources costs imposed on the civilian 
economy by military activities and defence procurement, he was unable to raise the 
upper limit of defence costs in 1989 above 133 billion rubles.18 
1.2. The CIA Figures and Their Critics 
In the 1970s and 1980s western government agencies and independent scholars 
attempted to overcome the Soviet policy of misinformation in different ways. The 
CIA discarded official Soviet figures altogether and developed a direct costing or 
“building block” methodology. This began with intelligence–based estimates of 
quantities of defence resources consumed or stockpiled in each year and prices of 
each resource in dollar equivalents of some base year, for example 1970 or 1982; for 
each block of a given resource the quantity multiplied by the base–year price gave its 
dollar value; the sum of values of the blocks gave the CIA its figure for overall Soviet 
defence outlays in constant dollars.19 The constant ruble value of Soviet defence 
activity was estimated either by applying ruble prices of a base year where known 
directly to the same blocks of quantities, or by applying estimated dollar–ruble 
convertors to the dollar values already computed. Finally, the current ruble value of 
Soviet defence activity could be derived by applying estimates of price change in the 
current year relative to the base year.  
Admitting that the results were of uneven reliability, the CIA insisted that they 
were corroborated by other sources and also accepted by other intelligence services.20 
But this assessment was challenged, most notably by Lee and Steven Rosefielde. 
They charged that the CIA’s direct costing procedures were incomplete, understated 
the growing quality and cost of Soviet weapons, were insufficiently transparent, and 
proved insufficiently robust when new information appeared.21 
                                                     
16 Lee (1995), 145. 
17 Gams and Makarenko (1990). 
18 Steinberg (1992), 257. 
19 Specific controversies surround the dollar estimates that I do not consider here. 
A persistent critic was Holzman who, in a series of articles beginning with Holzman 
(1980), stressed the role of substitution or index number biases in the CIA figures. 
20 Swain (1990), 109. 
21 CIA (1976); Lee (1977); Rosefielde (1982). It was suggested that the building–
block methodology could only give a lower bound on Soviet spending because its 
coverage of the building blocks was inevitably incomplete. For the categories of 
equipment that were covered the CIA was alleged to understate the rates of growth of 
true quantities and costs. That is, it attributed too much of observed price changes to 
hidden inflation and so failed to capture the full improvement in the quality of Soviet 
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In the CIA’s exchanges with Lee and Rosefielde there was bad feeling on each 
side and the implication of bad faith on the other. Lee and Rosefielde separately 
suggested that the CIA had colluded in a Soviet strategy of disinformation, resulting 
in understatement of the Soviet military–economic effort. The conclusions that they 
drew diverged, however. According to Rosefielde, the result was insufficient United 
States preparedness for war.22 According to Lee, the result was excessive United 
States engagement in arms control; since the Soviet economy was already at the 
limits of its military–industrial potential, restraining the arms race would one–sidedly 
advantage the Soviet Union since only the United States was capable of further 
mobilisation.23 
Figure 4. Soviet Military Spending in Rubles and Current Prices, 1950 to 1980: 
Alternative Estimates 
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Source: Figures are from Noren (1995), 269, except Masliukov (from Masliukov and 
Glubokov, 1999, 105), Rosefielde (from Rosefielde, 1987, 186), and Wiles (from Rosefielde, 
1990, 70). 
When we see the estimates of Lee and Rosefielde alongside those of the CIA in 
figure 3 there is irony in the relative closeness of the resulting figures. They differed 
                                                                                                                                           
weapons through time; this led to an understatement of Soviet military stocks relative 
to the United States. At the same time it failed to observe the full extent of price 
inflation, and this led to understatement of the cost of Soviet defence activity to the 
economy supplying it. Lee and Steven Rosefielde argued that the CIA methodology 
lacked transparency in withholding the evidence base of prices and quantities from 
which the building blocks were valued, and the procudure for consistent revision of 
serial data when new information was factored in. Finally, they diagnosed lack of 
robustness from the character of CIA responses to new information. In the most 
celebrated case, when the “benchmark” figure of 50 billion rubles in 1970 transpired 
it was more than twice the existing CIA estimate. The latter was then revised 
upwards, but the CIA claimed that this revision would have happened anyway in the 
course of repricing and was independent of the “new information”. Burton (1983) 
replied on behalf of the CIA, but neither Rosefielde (1987) nor Lee (1995) was 
reconciled. Although the CIA’s direct costing exercise was wound up after the fall of 
communism, those formerly engaged in it continued to defend their position (Noren, 
1995; Firth and Noren, 1998). 
22 Rosefielde (1987). 
23 Lee (1995). 
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far less among themselves than with others. But we find this in other fields of inquiry 
as well.24 Those who differ most bitterly are often drawn together by the gravitation 
of intense debate, and small differences may sustain ill feeling as easily as large ones, 
especially when each side claims moral victory over the other. 
1.3. Alternative Methodologies 
Many took a different view on Soviet defence spending from the CIA, but what they 
all had in common, lacking the CIA’s advantage of access to intelligence–based data, 
was some greater reliance on the use of Soviet published information. This was true 
of all of them, even those who criticised the CIA most severely for following a 
Soviet–inspired line. Therefore their advantage, if they had one, could lie only in 
greater scholarship. 
Of all of them Rosefielde worked nearest to the lines of the CIA’s direct costing 
methodology. Rosefielde started from the same quantity building blocks as the CIA 
supplemented or corrected by those of the United States Defense Intelligence Agency 
(DIA) and base–year prices or costs of 1960 that the CIA at first advocated, then later 
abandoned. In addition, Rosefielde claimed a superior methodology of price 
adjustment for quality change in later years. The result was a measure of defence 
spending in rubles that approximately matched that of the CIA but Rosefielde 
claimed the match was no accident: the CIA estimates were being forced to adapt to 
realities, but the adjustment was being done dishonestly under a pretence of 
scholarship. Moreover the implications of the CIA’s and Rosefielde’s estimates for 
military stockbuilding in real terms were quite different: in Rosefielde’s view the 
Soviet Union had substantially overtaken the United States in its military capabilities 
by the 1980s. 
The rest, including Lee, worked directly with Soviet data and did not attempt to 
build from blocks in physical units; if they estimated defence activity in real terms, it 
was usually at the final stage of deflating nominal values. Lee for example began 
from the residual of the nominal gross output of the machine building industry in 
each year after subtracting reported or estimated net intermediate and final deliveries 
to other sectors and inventories; this, which he attributed to military procurement, 
became the foundation stone of a calculation of the wider military budget. As figure 3 
indicates Lee produced figures in a range that approximately straddled those 
published by the CIA. To Lee, as to Rosefielde, this was no accident but the mark of 
his own moral victory.  
Rosefielde also worked with the machine building residual and approved of this 
method. Against it may be made a general point: working with small residuals left 
after subtracting one large number from another is always hazardous because small 
errors in the larger numbers lead to large errors in the smaller ones. But there is also 
an important point for it, and perhaps one that could not have been made before: a 
document in the Soviet archives for 1937 shows that officials understood exactly the 
danger of publishing information that might permit computation of a heavy industry 
residual: it could reveal the volume of military procurement.25 
Beyond Lee and Rosefielde a number of others also attempted to estimate Soviet 
defence spending by decoding Soviet official data. Among these were both academic 
scholars and staff researchers at the US Defence Intelligence Agency. Starting from 
the official military budget which they generally treated as representing outlays on 
the pay and subsistence of troops, they added varying shares of other items in the 
budget, or of the accumulation fund or additions to state reserves, to cover the other 
costs of maintenance, operations, construction, and R&D. DIA estimates turned out 
                                                     
24 The same is found when we look at competing estimates of Soviet real GDP 
growth; see Harrison (2002). 
25 Barber, Harrison, Simonov, and Starkov (2000), 21. 
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larger than those of the CIA, but those of other scholars were often smaller, 
sometimes much smaller.26  
Some estimates of this type were very elaborate. Most complex was the apparatus 
developed by Steinberg, who began from the hunch that most Soviet defence 
production and activity was excluded from the official national accounts; he created a 
methodology that accounted for hidden real and financial flows and distributed them 
among producers and users in such a way as to consistently reveal the true scale of 
Soviet defence.27 But the hunch itself remained untested and has not been confirmed 
since. Unlike those of others in this group, as figure 3 shows, Steinberg’s estimates 
were relatively large and close to those of the CIA. 
Cleverest was the method of Peter Wiles, who argued that the Soviet statisticians 
had hidden military procurement by accounting for it only in net terms, after 
subtracting depreciation which he called the “weapons write–off”.28 Wiles too was 
playing a hunch that has not been substantiated since. There was a promise in these 
methods that Rosefielde for one recognised at the time.29 But in retrospect it is fair to 
say that the promise has not been fulfilled; neither Steinberg nor Wiles is here today 
to make it good, and no one else has followed in their steps. 
Finally I arrange the estimates mentioned so far in a table that considers 1980 
alone, and compare them with various measures of overall economic activity in that 
year: total government purchases, the net material product, and GNP. The estimates 
in table 1 fall clearly into three groups. At between 13 and 17 per cent of Soviet GNP 
are those of Michaud, Lee, Steinberg, Rosefielde (not shown but listed in a note to the 
table), and the CIA. At about 8 per cent of GNP the figures estimated by SIPRI 
coincide almost exactly with those revealed since the fall of communism. In a class of 
its own remains the 3 per cent admitted and advertised under Brezhnev. 
                                                     
26 Higher DIA figures are presented in Michaud (1990), but the methodology also 
represented by Duchêne (1987), Duchêne and Steinberg (1987), and Mochizuki 
(1987) has roots that go back to Becker (1964) and these tended to come up with 
lower figures. A methodology of the same general class underlay the SIPRI figures 
shown in figure 3 and table 1. 
27 Steinberg (1987, 1990a, 1990b). 
28 Wiles and Efrat (1985);Wiles (1987). 
29 Rosefielde (1990). 
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Table 1. Soviet Military Spending in Rubles and Current Prices, 1980: Alternative 
Estimates 
  Per Cent of 
 
Billion 
Rubles
Total 
Budget 
Outlays NMP GNP 
1. US Defense Intelligence 
Agency (high) 107 36.3 23.6 17.3 
2. William T. Lee (high) 106 36.0 23.3 17.1 
3. US Defense Intelligence 
Agency (low) 96 32.6 21.1 15.5 
4. US Central Intelligence 
Agency 94 31.9 20.7 15.2 
5. William T. Lee (low) 93 31.6 20.5 15.0 
6. Dmitri Steinberg 81.2 27.6 17.9 13.1 
7. USSR State Budget, 1989 
basis 48.9 16.6 10.8 7.9 
8. Stockholm International 
Peace Research Institute 48.7 16.5 10.7 7.9 
9. USSR State Budget, 
contemporary basis 17.1 5.8 3.8 2.8 
Source: figures in rubles, except rows 1 and 7, are from Noren (1995), 269. For row 1 see 
Michaud (1990), 120. For row 7 (USSR State Budget, 1989 basis), 48.9 billion rubles based 
on the defence share of the state budget or 49 billion rubles based on the same share of net 
material product utilised. 48.9 billion rubles is confirmed by Masliukov and Glubokov (1999), 
105. A figure for the share of defence in Soviet GNP that is approximately equivalent to 
others in the table but for 1977, not 1980, is estimated by Rosefielde (1987), 204, at 16.5 per 
cent. 
Shares of total budget government outlays, net material product (NMP) and gross national 
product (GNP) are computed on the basis of 294.6, 454.1 and 619 billion rubles from 
Goskomstat (1987), 629, and Goskomstat (1990), 6 and 15 respectively. For 1980 Masliukov 
and Glubokov (1999), 105, give the defence share in GNP as 7.4 per cent based on a GNP 
figure of 661.9 billion rubles; no explanation is given for the 43 billion ruble excess over the 
official Goskomstat figure of 619 billions. For 1985 to 1987 and 1999 their GNP series 
follows that of Goskomstat, but there is another unexplained gap in 1988. Since Masliukov 
and Glubokov give GNP figures to one more decimal place than those released by 
Goskomstat, and also give GNP figures for 1960 and 1970 that have not been released by 
Goskomstat at all, it would appear that their information was based on privileged access to 
Goskomstat data; such figures cannot therefore be easily dismissed. At the same time it is hard 
to resist the logic of the fact that 661.9 is only a misplaced decimal point and a keystroke 
away from 619 and that 619 was the intended figure. This suspicion is strengthened by the 
superior internal consistency of the Goskomstat series: for example, taking the Goskomstat 
figure for 1980 as a base nominal GNP grew by 25.5 per cent up to 1985, which 
approximately matches the 25.2 per cent growth in the Goskomstat series for NMP produced 
over the same period and falls slightly below the 28.3 per cent growth reported for the gross 
social product; Goskomstat’s GNP growth rate also approximately matches the growth over 
the same period in the alternative series estimated by Steinberg (1990), 168–9 and 228, 26.7 
per cent for GNP on an official basis (pp. 168-9) and 24.6 per cent for true GNP (p. 228). In 
contrast, taking the 661.9 billion figure of Masliukov and Glubokov as a base GNP increased 
by only 17.4 per cent up to 1985, and this is clearly out of line with all the other estimates 
available. I thank Byung–Yeon Kim for advice on this matter. 
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3. The Konoplev Report 
A new documentary source from the close of the Brezhnev era allows us the chance 
to put this uncertainty to an end. Unfortunately it is only a chance, because there is a 
gap in the provenance of the document concerned. 30 As a result we cannot be 
completely assured that it is genuine. At the same time it is not obvious how anyone 
might have gained from fabricating it with the aim of engaging in a game of 
disinformation.  Moreover its uniqueness suggests that it did not form part of any 
campaign or trade in deception. 
The document is entitled “Report of the Military–Industrial Commission of the 
USSR S[upreme Soviet] [and] C[entral] C[ommittee] of the CPSU on the Utilisation 
of Allocations to Defence for the Quinquennium (1976–1981)”. It is signed by 
commission chairman B.V. Konoplev; I will refer to it below as “the Konoplev 
report”.31 Dated 7 January 1981, the document states that it is presented “with the aim 
of preparation of the working and reference materials for the report of the C[entral] 
C[ommittee] to the Congress”, that is, the report that general secretary L.I. Brezhnev 
would deliver the following month to the twenty sixth party congress. Consistently 
with this the document is marked as an appendix to some other more substantial 
document: “Prilozhenie k No. 2/437–710/VS/TsK”.  
The form of the document is a photocopy of thirteen typewritten pages; evidently 
the original was archived in a larger file, so each page is numbered twice, once in its 
internal sequence from 1 to 13, and again in the archivist’s hand from 46 to 58. the 
document is stamped “Seriia ‘K’ [Series K]” and “Sov. sekretno [entirely secret]”. In 
keeping with its security classification the document is marked “Ekz[empliar] No. 2 
[copy no. 2]”. 
The report details “expenditures on defence for the quinquennium (1976–1981) 
by type of the Armed Forces and arms of service, and also data concerning other 
expenditures associated with provision of the defensive capability of the country, its 
                                                     
30 The provenance of this document, listed under the References as Konoplev 
(1981), is as follows: Peter Wiles, internationally known for his interest in the 
measurement of Soviet military spending, received a photocopy of it unsolicited in 
1991 or 1992. He shared it privately with a few colleagues including myself and he 
and I discussed it in considerable detail. Although ignorant of its origin, and despite 
differences in our interpretation of it, Wiles and I concluded at the time that it was 
probably genuine. Taking into account the residual uncertainties Wiles resolved not 
to share the information in the document more widely until either some external 
confirmation could be found or ten years had passed. Sadly he died in 1997 without 
the first condition being met, but his ten–year limit has now also expired. Therefore I 
take the opportunity to release this information into academic circulation so that 
others may scrutinise and judge it. A scanned image of the copy in my possession is 
available at  
URL http://www.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/staff/faculty/harrison/papers/konoplev.pdf. 
31 The title in Russian is Otchet Voenno-promyshlennoi komissii VS SSSR TsK 
KPSS ob ispol’zovanii assignovanii na oborony za piatiletku (1976–1981 gg.). In 
principle other constructions of “VS SSSR TsK KPSS” are possible. Thus VS SSSR is 
the abbreviation not only for the USSR Supreme Soviet (Verkhovnyi sovet) but also 
for the USSR Armed Forces (Vooruzhennye sily), so the commission might strictly be 
of the Armed Forces, not of the Supreme Soviet. I read it as the Supreme Soviet on 
the basis of Konoplev’s known affiliations with the latter. “TsK KPSS” could be 
translated as “to” the Central Committee since the case of TsK is indeterminate. Since 
the Central Committee was an unlikely recipient I read it as “[and of]” the Central 
Committee, in other words as the report of a temporary joint commission. Thanks to 
Julian Cooper and R.W. Davies for this suggestion. 
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strategic interests, and the interests of our allies”. Apart from a few statements of an 
ideological character (“Thanks to the care of the party and the efforts of the whole 
Soviet people”, etc.) the document is exclusively descriptive and quantitative and this 
is where its interest lies. It is organised in eight sections and two appendices that may 
be listed as follows: 
I. Maintenance of the Armed Forces 
II. Procurement of Weapons, Military Equipment, and Stores 
III. Procurement of Scientific and Technical Products 
IV. Capital Construction and Capital Repair, and Special–Purpose and 
Residential Construction 
V. Provision of Pensions for Servicemen and Their Family Members 
VI. Maintenance of Armed Forces Within the Provisions of the 
Organisation of the Warsaw Treaty and Treaties for Mutual Defence 
VII. Maintenance of Soviet Personnel and Establishment of Military 
Advisers in Foreign States Within the Provisions of Treaties for 
Friendship and Mutual Aid and Special–Purpose Agreements 
VIII. Partial Repayment of Rent for Utilisation of Air Force Bases and 
Foreign Ports 
Appendix I. [Maintenance of Special Forces …] 
Appendix II. [Expenditures on Payment for Production of Nuclear Weapons …]  
For the most part what is covered under each item is rendered self–explanatory 
by the more detailed figures that are supplied. In some cases further definition is 
added elsewhere in the text. We are told in various places that item II, “Weapons, 
Military Equipment, and Stores”, includes “means for the purchase of atomic 
munitions” of all kinds with their means of delivery. Item III, “Scientific and 
Technical Products”, comprises “payment for scientific and technical products 
produced on the orders of the Ministry of Defence in scientific research institutes and 
design bureaux of the Ministry of the Aircraft Industry, the Ministry of Medium 
Engineering, the Ministry of Heavy Engineering, the Ministry of the Radio Industry, 
and the Chief Administration for Space”. Item VI covers the maintenance of Soviet 
forces “structurally incorporated in the Organisation of the Warsaw Treaty” and 
stationed in the northern, central, and southern groups of forces “as well as in 
particular countries”. 
Some further clarification is necessary. The Military–Industrial Commission 
(Voenno-promyshlennaia komissiia) of the USSR Supreme Soviet and CPSU Central 
Committee is hitherto unknown; it was perhaps a temporary body set up specifically 
to prepare for the February 1981 party congress. Its title seems almost deliberately 
confusing since Voenno-promyshlennaia komissiia or VPK for short was also the 
unofficial title of the well known and very important Commission for Military–
Industrial Questions of the Presidium of the USSR Council of Ministers, upgraded in 
1987 to a State Commission of the USSR Council of Ministers. The latter VPK, the 
one that really mattered, was the consolidated successor organisation to the Special 
Committees that created the Soviet nuclear, missile, and radiolocation industries after 
World War II. The heads of the VPK were D.F. Ustinov followed by L.V. Smirnov 
(1962 to 1985), Iu.D. Masliukov (1985 to 1987 and 1991), and I.S. Belousov (1987 to 
1991).32 Thus the chief of the VPK in January 1981 was Smirnov, which confirms 
that the body of which Konoplev was chairman at that time could not have been the 
VPK about which we already knew.  
Konoplev himself was a party official and USSR Supreme Soviet member of long 
standing. He was first secretary of the regional party committee for the Perm’ oblast’ 
                                                     
32 Minaev (1999), 21. 
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and head of the region’s local government. In the Supreme Soviet Konoplev chaired a 
committee on housing, which seems a long way from defence affairs. On the other 
hand Perm’, formerly Molotov, is a major centre of the defence industry and 
Konoplev himself was on friendly terms of long standing with defence minister 
Ustinov and other Politburo members.33 These circumstances make Konoplev a 
reasonable choice to take a leading role in scrutiny of the Soviet defence complex. 
Some unsolved problems arise from the nature of the scrutiny involved. It is not 
clear why Konoplev was asked to carry it out or who was meant to read the results. In 
his memoirs Gorbachev has written that in the period before his leadership “All 
statistics concerning the military–industrial complex were top secret, inacccessible 
even to members of the Politburo”; “only two or three people had access to data on 
the military–industrial complex.34 According to a military source the true scale of 
military funding was known to “only four men […] the General Secretary, the 
Council of Ministers Chairman, the Minister of Defence, and its Chief of the General 
Staff”.35 Iurii Masliukov, a leader of the Council of Ministers VPK under Gorbachev, 
has confirmed that: 
Until 1988 summary figures concerning the defence of the country were 
considered to be a secret of exceptional state importance; a limited circle of 
people (the leadership of USSR Gosplan and not even all Politburo members) 
were familiar with them. It was forbidden to reproduce such figures in typing 
pools, and in documents they were circulated by authorised individuals from hand 
to hand.36 
Was the report read beyond this “limited circle”? The version of the document that is 
available is marked “copy no. 2”, so more than one copy was made for official use, 
but perhaps not many more, and few enough that each was marked by hand. 
If the information in the Konoplev report was so sensitive, it is not clear why a 
joint commission of the parliament and ruling party was appointed to compile it. If 
the leadership required it, one would have expected the Ministry of Defence to supply 
it directly. Gorbachev recalls that Ustinov “essentially had monopoly control” over 
defence information; it was a serious breach of protocol for outsiders, even other 
Politburo members, to question him.37 Steinberg, visiting Moscow in 1990/91, 
confirmed that “the Defence Ministry continues to exercise a complete monopoly on 
the flow of information in the area of defence finances”.38 Perhaps Konoplev was not 
an outsider to the defence complex. But his involvement still seems unnecessary. 
Finally, it is not clear why the leadership required such sensitive information in 
order to prepare for a highly public and largely stage–managed occasion such as a 
party congress. 
It follows that we do not fully understand the role of the Konoplev report in the 
Soviet system of power and information. Consequently, doubts may be raised about 
its authenticity that are hard to answer. 
                                                     
33 Boris Vsevolodovich Konoplev was alive and well and residing in Perm’ as 
recently as March 2002 when he gave a press interview that provides the information 
in this paragraph (Konoplev, 2002). I thank Julian Cooper for this reference. 
34 Gorbachev (1996), 136, 215. 
35 Generals V.G. Kulikov and M.A. Gareev writing in Vooruzheniia, politika, 
konversiia, 1993, no. 2, cited by Firth and Noren (1998), 260n. 
36 Masliukov and Glubokov (1999), 105. 
37 Gorbachev (1995), 121, 136, 204. 
38 Steinberg (1992), 244. 
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Good practice in the the authentication and interpretation of historical documents 
is a principal theme of Richard J. Evans’s recent account of his expert testimony to 
the David Irving trial in the spring of 2000.39 Reading Evans suggests to me that in 
the case of the Konoplev report we need explicit criteria of authenticity. This is 
because we lack the knowledge of provenance, that is, continuous information 
concerning where a document has been held and who has handled it since the 
moment it was created, that would normally be decisive. Four tests seem potentially 
useful: 
a) Originality. Is the document original or a copy? If a copy, is it a mechanical 
or electronic facsimile or has it been transcribed or retyped? If a copy, is it 
uniquely identified by a serial number or signature? 
b) Contextual integrity. Is the document complete in itself or are there elements 
missing ? Does the document provide its own context or does the context 
require to be established by presumption or hypothesis? 
c) Formal comparability. Does the document conform to other documents of the 
same type in style and presentation? 
d) Corroboration. Does the substantial information in the document find support 
elsewhere? 
In the course of my own research I have handled many hundreds of official 
documents in former Soviet archives and it must be said that even if I knew nothing 
of their provenence most if not all that I have seen would get fairly full marks under 
all four headings. The Konoplev report does not conform to this pattern.  
Consider each test. Under originality the document we have is not an original but 
a photocopy of what appears to be a typed or duplicated original. Its security stamp, 
file reference, copy number, and personal signature are somewhat reassuring: say 7 
out of 10. Under contextual integrity we have a document that purports to be 
complete and self–explanatory. However, we do not have the more substantial 
document to which it was appended and we cannot easily guess what that contained, 
especially if it was for public consumption or even for limited circulation. Worse, we 
do not have access to the workings or methodology that produced the figures in it and 
reconstructing this will require considerable speculation below. Here therefore we do 
less well, say 6 out of 10. Under formal comparability we have an immediate 
problem: there is nothing very close with which the Konoplev report may be 
compared. At the same time it has the language and presentation of an official report 
and again the apparatus of security classification, file number, reference number, 
signature, and archival repagination are helpful as well as potentially verifiable. It 
looks like an official document that was later officially archived: say 8 out of 10.  
Under corroboration there is almost nothing. The figures in the Konoplev report 
are quite different from and much larger than those supplied or estimated by other 
authorities, and there is no Konoplev–shaped hole left by other data into which the 
report may easily be fitted. In this sense the Konoplev report is somewhat sensational 
and this immediately raises a question mark for the simple reason that sensations are 
very rare in economics. The rarity of sensational discoveries in economics reflects 
partly the nature of the discipline: in economics everything must fit together, so the 
first suspect when an outlying figure is found is the reliability of the figure itself. 
Under corroboration, then, nul points.  
Total score: 7 + 6 + 8 + 0 = 21 out of a possible 40, about what one would get by 
tossing a coin. 
                                                     
39 Evans (2002). 
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4. Plan or Outcome? 
The Konoplev report provides ruble figures for defence outlays of two kinds. First is 
the figures shown in table 2. They break the cumulative total for the period of the 
tenth five–year plan, 1976 to 1980, down into annual figures, one for each year of the 
piatiletka plus one that is presumably the planned figure for 1981; a result of this is 
that the report’s title oddly covers not five but six years. The reader should note right 
away that the annual figures in table 2 are very large; that for 1980 is larger than 
anything in table 1 by a factor of more than 50 per cent. Second, the report provides 
more detailed figures under the eight items and two appendices that are listed above, 
except for pensions, but these are five–year totals without an annual breakdown. They 
are shown in Appendix 2. 
Within all these figures there are puzzles. Some are of the adding–up and 
rounding kind; they lead to minor internal inconsistencies or are purely trivial. They 
are disconcerting all the same. We think of good bureaucrats as taking pride in detail. 
Dictators in particular have reason to be intolerant of sloppiness since their main 
problem is often to have accurate knowledge what their subordinates are really doing 
when they look as if they are loyally carrying out orders. Under Stalin a casual 
attitude to the facts might easily have fatal consequences.40 
Other puzzles are more significant because no internal inconsistency arises as a 
result, but the figures given are clearly too proportional or too smooth. Table 2 gives 
the annual figures into which the quinquennial total of defence spending is broken 
down. In 1977, 1978, and 1979 each annual figure increases over the year before by 
exactly 6.36 billion rubles. In 1980 it increases by 12.77 billion rubles which is 
almost exactly twice the increment in the preceding years; the sudden acceleration is 
plausible given that the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in December 1979. 
Table 2. Soviet Budget Allocations to Defence, 1976 to 1981 (billion rubles) 
 Total 
Change Over 
Previous Year
1976 133.71 .. 
1977 140.07 6.36 
1978 146.43 6.36 
1979 152.79 6.36 
1980 165.56 12.77 
Total 738.56 .. 
1981 176.11 10.55 
Source: Konoplev (1981), 3. 
Then, consider the breakdown of the 738.56 billion quinquennial total “by type of 
the Armed Forces and arms of service” shown in table 3. The most important 
percentages are strangely round. For example 295.424 billion rubles in row I, 
“Maintenance of the Armed Forces”, is exactly 40 percent of the total. And the same 
is true down to item IV, by which time we have accounted for exactly 85 per cent of 
total outlays on defence. 
                                                     
40 See for example documents relating to the fate of Gosplan chief N.A. 
Vozensenskii, alleged to have engaged in covering up a plan failure in 1949, provided 
by Khlevniuk et al. (2002), 274–85. 
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If we look more closely at the various subdivisions  we find the same thing 
repeated. Table 4 shows how maintenance is broken down among the various arms of 
service and categories of troops. Again we find, for example, that the ground forces’ 
maintenance accounted for exactly 25 per cent of total maintenance, and that the air 
defence forces’ maintenance accounted for exactly 15 per cent of that of the ground 
forces. And so on. 
A few figures do not fit this template. In table 4, for example, below item IV 
figures for pensions, the costs of Warsaw Treaty forces’ maintenance, and the rent of 
foreign bases are rounded in rubles but not per cent; the costs of foreign advisers’ 
maintenance are unrounded in both columns.  
In short, what are we looking at? Certainly, we are not looking at an accurate 
account of ex post expenditures, because no such complex budget in the history of the 
world has ever been fulfilled in such exact proportions. Instead, it seems likely that 
these figures were compiled on some other basis.  
Table 3. Soviet Budget Allocations to Defence, 1976 to 1980, by Category of 
Expenditure (billion rubles) 
 Billion Rubles 
Per Cent of 
Column Total 
I. Maintenance of Armed Forces 295.424  40  
II. Procurement of Weapons, etc. 184.840  25  
III. Procurement of Scientific and 
Technical Products 73.855  10  
IV. Capital Construction 73.855  10  
V. Pensions 4.000  0.54  
VI. Maintenance of Armed Forces 
under the Warsaw Treaty 55.000  7.44  
VII. Maintenance of Foreign 
Advisors, etc. 7.286  0.86a  
VIII. Rent of Foreign Facilities 44.500  6.25b  
Total 738.560c  100c  
a 7.286 billion rubles is 0.99 per cent of the total given. 
b 44.5 billion rubles is 6.03 per cent of the total given. 
c The row totals should be 738.76 billion rubles and 100.09%, not the 738.56 billion and 100% 
totals given. 
Source: Konoplev (1981), 3. For further explanation of row titles see the text. 
One possibility is that the Konoplev report reveals the implementation of a 
planning algorithm for which Wiles invented the name of “top–down 
disaggregation”. Was this how it worked? Suppose the Politburo first set the overall 
budget allocation to defence in rubles. Then, perhaps, the defence ministry distributed 
the overall sum across the major and minor headings using conventional rules of 
thumb: thus it allocated 40 per cent to “maintenance of the armed forces”, of which 
35 per cent was disbursed to the strategic missiles troops, and so on. In this way one 
might imagine a cascade of percentages spreading the flow of cash out into a 
widening stream as it descended each level of the administrative hierarchy. Such an 
allocative mechanism could cope with distributing resources to the main demands on 
the ministry. However, some items were driven by exogenous demands that are 
awkward because they do not fit: pension entitlements, for example, reflected the 
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demographic profile of past cohorts of military personnel and so had to be fixed as a 
round ruble figure, not a round percentage. Finally the internal algorithm, combined 
with the exogenous drivers, left residual funding for residual items. This hypothesis 
sufficiently explains the oddities that we see.41  
Table 4. Soviet Budgetary Allocations to Defence, 1976 to 1980: Maintenance of the 
Armed Forces, by Arms of Service (billion rubles and per cent) 
Branch [Sub–Branch] Billion Rubles 
Per Cent of Column 
Total [of Branch 
Subtotal] 
Strategic Missile  Forces 103.398 35  
Ground  Forces 73.856 25 [100] 
[Missile  Forces] [11.816] .. [16] 
[Air Defence  Forces] [11.078] .. [15] 
[Motorised Rifle  Forces] [14.771] .. [20] 
[Armoured  Forces] [17.725] .. [24] 
[Engineering  Forces] [5.169] .. [7] 
[Artillery  Forces] [5.908] .. [8] 
[Communications  Forces] [4.431] .. [6] 
[Special  Forces] [1.477]а .. [4] 
Air Force 64.993b 22 [100] 
[Long–Range Aviation] [19.479] .. [30] 
[Frontal Aviation] [31.167] .. [48] 
[Military Transport Aviation] [14.285] .. [22] 
Navy 53.176 18 [100] 
[Surface Fleet] [21.270] .. [40] 
[Submarine Fleet] [23.929] .. [45] 
[Naval Aviation] [7.976] .. [15] 
Total 295.424 100  
a The figure of 1.477 billion rubles is exactly half that required to balance the total of 73.856 
billion rubles shown for ground forces’ maintenance, and to yield a share of 4 per cent in the 
latter. For an alternative figure see table 2.8. 
b The figures shown for the composition of the air forces’ maintenance sum to 64.931 billion 
rubles, not the 64.993 billion given by the source, and their given percentages match the 
corrected total, not that shown. 
Source: Konoplev (1981), 4. 
An alternative explanation is that the compilers of the Konoplev report were not 
at all close to the allocation process, as the first possibility might suggest, but on the 
contrary had been kept away at a respectful distance. Perhaps Konoplev’s researchers 
had limited leverage with which to command information; if so, they might have 
                                                     
41 In particular, it implies that the ijα s in table A–1, column (4) could be 
interpreted as planning ratios fixed by the Ministry of Defence. 
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extracted ruble magnitudes for overall defence spending from the Ministry of Finance 
but got a cool reception at the General Staff. Perhaps the Ministry of Defence chose 
to withhold exact information about ruble values of many items, and instead provided 
only rough percentages from which Konoplev’s team then had to work backwards to 
yield ruble sums.  
Of these two possibilities my money is on the second. It corresponds more 
closely with the institutional realities. A precedent exists in a monograph on military 
budgeting for World War II published by the USSR Ministry of Defence in 1967 in a 
limited–circulation edition.42 The latter shows us the cautious style in which the 
Ministry of Defence engaged in partial revelation even within the restricted 
boundaries of circulation to a privileged group of officials. In it we find a skeleton of 
ruble aggregates, percentage shares, and index numbers somewhat similar to that of 
the Konoplev report, one from which the attentive reader might construct an 
approximation, but no more, to the statistical truth.43 
5. What the Figures Mean 
5.1. The Konoplev Gap 
Let us turn from the internal logic of the Konoplev figures to their consistency with 
what is more widely thought to have been the case. As soon as we do this we come up 
against their sheer size. Does anything in the report permit them to be easily 
reconciled with the lower figures of Masliukov and Glubokov, the western 
intelligence agencies, and the scholarly estimates that are in circulation?  
Think of the “Konoplev gap” as the difference between the figures for 1976–80  
in the Konoplev report and those suggested by the Soviet defence budget in 1989 
revealed by Masliukov and Glubokov. Table 5 shows that on an annual average basis 
the Konoplev gap was somewhat more than 70 billion rubles. This is a purely 
nominal gap which allows for neither inflation nor real changes between the two 
periods. Considered by category of expenditure, 21 billion rubles of the gap are 
accounted for by items VI to VIII which were clearly omitted from the 1989 figures 
and possibly no longer very significant in that year. Another 10 billion rubles are 
accounted for by a lower level of capital construction in 1989 which is not 
implausible in so far as construction tends to be volatile in all economies and systems. 
The mystery component and largest single source of the Konoplev gap is apparently 
nearly 40 billions of extra outlays on the maintenance of the armed forces. 
Further light is thrown on the sources of the gap by the distribution of outlays 
across arms of service. Table 5 shows that, while the gap is distributed across all 
branches, more than half is accounted for by a single branch: “other forces”, that is, 
the strategic missile forces.  
Any attempt to explain the larger differences between the figures in the Konoplev 
report and the official figures more recently circulated should begin with the 
Konoplev figure for maintenance of the strategic missile forces which, at 103 billion 
rubles over five years, is one of the largest subtotals under any heading in the entire 
document.  
                                                     
42 Terpilovskii (1967). This volume is marked “dlia sluzhebnogo pol’zovaniia 
[for official use]”. 
43 Doe (1982) and Harrison (1990). 
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Table 5. The Konoplev Gap (billion rubles) 
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 (1) (2) (3)
By Category of Expenditure    
I. Maintenance of Armed Forces 59.1 21.0 38.1
II. Procurement of Weapons, etc. 37.0 35.2 1.7
III. Procurement of Scientific and 
Technical Products 14.8 14.3 0.5
IV. Capital Construction 14.8 4.0 10.8
V. Pensions 0.8 2.6 -1.8
VI. Maintenance of Armed Forces 
under the Warsaw Treaty 11.0 .. ..
VII. Maintenance of Foreign 
Advisors, etc. 1.5 .. ..
VIII. Rent of Foreign Facilities 8.9 .. ..
By Arm of Service    
Ground Forces 31.2 21.0 10.2
Navy 21.1 12.1 9.1
Air Force 24.8 12.3 12.5
Other Forces 47.6 16.8 30.9
General Provision 22.9 14.1 8.8
Residual .. 1.1 ..
Total 147.7 77.3 70.4
Source: By category of expenditure, column 1 figures computed from table 3 adjusted to 
annual average; column 2 computed from the total given by Masliukov and Glubokov (1999), 
105, and shares in the total on page 114. By arms of service, column 1 figures for items I to IV 
by arm of service computed from tables 2.1 to 2.4 and adjusted to annual average; column 2 
computed from from the total given by Masliukov and Glubokov (1999), 105, and shares in 
the total on page 116, but note that these shares sum to less than 100 per cent. All rows, 
column 3 is column 1 less column 2. 
It is surprising that maintenance should turn out to be the main source of the 
Konoplev gap. This is because it is widely thought that the greatest understatement of 
Soviet defence costs arose from the issuing of subsidies to defence industry and 
defence industry suppliers, which hid the true cost of weapons and equipment in 
civilian budgets. Thus Christopher Davis notes that the Soviet Ministry of Defence 
“was able to purchase substantial quantities of goods and services with modest 
official budget allocations as a result of its ‘heavy ruble’ […] a defence ruble could 
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buy three to four times as much more machinery and equipment than a civilian 
ruble”.44  
How heavy was the defence ruble? On the 1989 budget basis Soviet weapon 
procurement in 1988 was 34.2 billion “heavy” rubles. The largest single item of 
“hidden” defence costs that Steinberg identified in Soviet budgetary outlays  of 1988 
was direct subsidies to the defence industry worth 20.4 billion rubles. To these may 
be added 3.8 billion rubles of cross–subsidies from civilian to defence activity within 
the defence industry, and also 20.5 billion rubles of subsidies from the defence 
industry’s suppliers, making 78.9 billion “light” rubles as the true resource cost of 
weapons and military equipment procured in that year.45  
Comparing these figures suggests that 1 heavy ruble was worth 2.3 light, that is 
unsubsidised rubles. But this is not nearly enough to explain the difference between 
the Masliukov–Glubokov figure for 1980 of 48.9 billion rubles and Konoplev’s 165 
billion rubles. Nor does it help at all to explain the composition of the Konoplev gap. 
For there is no gap between Konoplev for 1976 to 1980 and the Masliukov–Glubokov 
figures for 1989 in weapons and equipment. The gap is all in maintenance and 
construction. 
This has led Julian Cooper to ask whether the spending figures in the Konoplev 
report are in fact based “not on actual prices but on some form of smetnyi [estimate] 
prices […] It is almost as if the smetnyi prices used by K[onoplev] were based on 
relative prices in dollars, not rubles”.46 On this line of thinking we should treat the 
Masliukov–Glubokov figures as truthful in their own terms, and explain the 
discrepancies thrown up by the Konoplev figures as the result of a repricing exercise 
using dollar weights. Machinery was expensive in the Soviet economy but cheap in 
the United States, and Soviet conscripts were cheap relative to expensive American 
volunteers. The Soviet armed forces used relatively more of the cheap factor, labour, 
and less of machinery which was the costly factor. Any revaluation of Soviet military 
spending in dollars would thus be vulnerable to an upward substitution bias that 
would inflate both total Soviet military spending relative to US military spending and 
also the expenditure share of soldiers’ pay and maintenance.  
I agree that this hypothesis could be set out in such as way as to sufficiently 
explain the size and distribution of the Konoplev gap. I see two obstacles, however. 
First, it has no foundation in the document itself, which does not mention prices, and 
specifies only that figures are measured in either “billions of rubles” or percentages of 
the military budget. Second, to the extent that they increased the size of the figures 
involved such calculations ought to have been kept even more secret than the true 
military budget at established prices; they would surely have been circulated only 
within a closed circle of experts and kept well away from a pre–congress report. 
Thus, on present information it is impossible to confirm this interpretation. 
5.2. The “True” Military Burden? 
Taken at face value, can the figures in the Konoplev report be used to estimate the 
Soviet military burden? The military burden is best measured as the proportion of 
national income that is allocated to military uses. To be meaningful it must satisfy 
tests of both internal and external consistency. Internal consistency requires that 
military spending is measured in the same prices that are used to compute the national 
income. External consistency requires that its coverage conforms to internationally 
accepted standards of defence accounting. 
                                                     
44 Davis (2002); see also Firth and Noren (1998), 190. 
45 Steinberg (1992), 240, 246, 256 (“cost padding”) and 258 (“price 
discrimination”). 
46 Personal communication, 11 September 2002. 
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A first pass at the problem is shown in table 6, the first row of which compares 
defence outlays from the Konoplev report with official figures for Soviet government 
outlays and the Soviet net material product utilised, all at established prices. The 
share of defence in government spending is shown to have fallen at first, then to have 
stabilised at around 60 percent. The share of national income is shown at more than 
one third and rising; it gained more than two per cent of national income within five 
years.  
Table 6. Soviet Budget Allocations to Defence, 1976 to 1981, Unadjusted (billion 
rubles and per cent) 
  Per Cent of 
 Billion Rubles 
Total 
Government 
Outlays NMP utilised
1976 133.71 59.0 34.9 
1977 140.07 57.7 35.1 
1978 146.43 56.3 34.8 
1979 152.79 55.3 35.3 
1980 165.56 56.2 36.5 
1981 176.11 56.8 37.2 
Source: Budget allocations in rubles are from Konoplev (1981), 3. Figures for total 
government outlays and NMP in 1976 to 1979 are from TsSU (1981), 522 and 380 
respectively, and in 1980 and 1981 from TsSU (1982), 562 and 418. 
However, these ratios do not satisfy either internal or external consistency tests. 
The net material product was computed using established prices which mixed “light” 
and “heavy” rubles.47 The Konoplev figures may have used both light and heavy 
rubles, but in a different mixture to the economy as a whole, or they may have used 
light rubles only, or they may have used some other kind of estimate rubles, perhaps 
dollar–related. None of these provides internal consistency; in the case of light or 
estimate rubles the percentages in the table are all inflated. 
If the Konoplev figures turned out to be measured in light rubles or unsubsidised 
prices then it would make sense to go a step further. In principle the unsubsidised 
prices of defence goods and services may be close to their “basic” prices or factor 
costs. In this case the Konoplev figures would be directly comparable with GNP at 
factor cost. Table 7 shows the comparison. 
In this table GNP is larger than NMP because GNP counts all final goods and 
services whereas NMP counts only intermediate services that are purchased by 
sectors making final goods. However, GNP at factor cost is less than at established 
prices because net indirect taxes must be removed to find value added. 
For external consistency defence also needs to be redefined. Not everything in the 
Konoplev report qualifies for defence spending under the GNP system of accounts. 
Table 7 shows the adjustment. We leave in items I to III which cover the maintenance 
and equipment of the Soviet armed forces and military R&D respectively, and also 
item VI and VII which cover the maintenance of Soviet forces assigned to the 
Warsaw Treaty Organisation and of foreign advisors. Other items go. Military capital 
                                                     
47 The Ministry of Defence monopoly of disaggregated defence information also 
prevented the statistical administration from accounting consistently for defence 
flows (Steinberg, 1992: 244). 
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construction (item IV) is omitted because, unlike weapons that can only be used in 
military operations and then for destruction, not production, 
the airfields, docks or other facilities used as bases [for such weapons] can be 
used with little or no modification for quite different purposes of a non–military 
nature. Very often such facilities are shared between military and civilian use. 
Moreover, the manner in which the facilities are utilised is essentially the same 
whether they are used by military personnel or others.48  
Military pensions (item V) go because they represent a welfare obligation incurred as 
a result of past spending, not a current allocation to defence. And the rent of foreign 
facilities (item VIII) must go by analogy with item IV. When these corrections are 
made the defence allocation for 1980 on an SNA basis emerges at 138 billion rubles 
rather than the 166 billion rubles given by Konoplev. 
Table 7. Soviet Budget Allocations to Defence in 1980: Adjustment to SNA Basis 
(billion rubles and per cent) 
Defence Allocation 165.6 
less Adjustment to SNA Basis  
IV. Capital construction –16.6 
V. Pensions –0.9 
VIII. Rent of Foreign Facilities –10.0 
Adjustment, Total –27.4 
Defence Allocation, SNA Basis 138.1 
Per cent of  
NMP at Established Prices 30.4 
GNP at Established Prices 22.3 
GNP at Factor Cost 24.6 
Source: The budget allocation to defence in rubles is from Konoplev (1981), 3. For adjustment 
of Soviet defence outlays to SNA (System of National Accounts) basis see the text; annual 
subtotals for items IV, V, VII, and VIII in 1980 are the quinquennial subtotals multiplied by 
the ratio of overall defence outlays in 1980 to the quinquennial total, i.e. by 165.56 ÷ 738.56. 
NMP and GNP at established prices in 1980 are 454.1 billion rubles from table 6 and 619 
billion rubles from Goskomstat (1990), 6. GNP at factor cost is 560.8 billion rubles being 619 
billion rubles at established prices multiplied by 0.906; the latter is the ratio of GNP at factor 
cost to the same at established prices estimated by the CIA (1990), 114–15, for 1982..  
This “narrow” classification of defence takes us in exactly the opposite direction 
from those who advocate broadening the definition of Soviet defence–related activity, 
sometimes to the point where most of the Soviet economy is seen as geared to 
military needs.49 But, as the compilers of the SNA make clear, grey areas involving 
defence are not a uniquely Soviet problem. Every economy has systems and activities 
that serve more than one purpose; while they add to the economy’s military potential 
                                                     
48 CEC et al. (1993), 146. More detail on the content of defence under the 
Classification of Functions of Government is contained in UN (2000), 43–44. 
49 For example Epstein (1990). 
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they add to its productive potential as well, and therefore should not be classified as 
consumed by defence. 
If the prices in the Konoplev report have any meaning in this context, table 7 puts 
the Soviet military burden in 1980 at one fifth to one quarter of national income on a 
GNP basis. This figure is not wholely without support from other sources, but the 
support is very weak. Gorbachev recalls that on coming to power in 1985 he found 
military spending to be “not 6 per cent but 20 per cent of the gross national product”, 
but this figure has no foundation in the revelations of the glasnost’ era and its basis 
has never been made clear.50 Steinberg’s final estimate of the Soviet military burden 
was 20 to 21 per cent of GNP in 1987 and 1988, but this figure included the full range 
of “hidden” defence costs some of which would have no place in a narrow definition 
of defence, for example the costs of mobilisation preparations and foreign aid.51 
A military burden of even one fifth of national income measured on a narrow 
basis is very large by peacetime standards. To find equivalent figures for other major 
economies we have to go back to the early years of World War II. For example, in 
1939 Germany’s military burden stood at 23 per cent of national income at market 
prices and Japan’s at 22 per cent; both figures doubled and tripled in the course of the 
war. Italy’s had reached 23 per cent by 1941, but this proved to be a wartime peak. 
Between 1939 and 1940 the military burden on the UK economy measured on a 
comparable basis jumped from a lower figure, 15 per cent, to a higher one, 44 per 
cent, while the Soviet military burden, 17 per cent in 1940, rose to 28 per cent in 
1941 when both defence outlays and GNP were measured at prewar factor costs. The 
US military burden rose from 11 to 31 per cent at market prices between 1941 and 
1942.52 In short, the level of outlays suggested by the Konoplev report appears to be 
without precedent for a major power without immediate plans for waging aggressive 
warfare or defending itself against immediate attack. 
6. Conclusions 
Our understanding of the role of the military budget in the allocation of Soviet 
resources has been considerably expanded by recent historical studies based in the 
archives. But our understanding of the influence of the military burden on Soviet 
economic performance, including its record of growth, slowdown, and collapse, 
remains fuzzy to say the least. To make matters worse, we do not have good measures 
of the size and trend of the burden itself. We know it was large but we do not know 
how large. We know it mattered but we do not know exactly why. 
The new evidence provided by the Konoplev report indicates that the military 
burden was much larger than was previously supposed, even on the basis of the most 
hawkish of western estimates. Taking interpretation to the limit of what is possible, 
the report indicates a military burden on Soviet resources in 1980 of more than a fifth 
of GNP. This is a very high figure, perhaps unprecedented by historical peacetime 
standards. However, it is too soon to be confident of the authenticity and reliability of 
the report itself. Until its authenticity is confirmed and its purposes are clarified our 
judgement should remain in suspense. 
                                                     
50 Gorbachev (1995), 215. It would be surprising if Gorbachev had been given 
any figures computed on a GNP basis as early as 1985. 
51 Steinberg (1992), 239. 
52 Figures from Harrison (1998), 21. 
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Appendix 1 
The simplified input–output table presented below allows us to define how budget 
allocations co–determined the overall allocation of resources. First, think of the 
economy as comprised of four sectors producing (1) specialised consumables: goods 
and services that could not be used except for consumption, for example food, 
clothing, and entertainment, (2) general–purpose products: goods and services that 
could be used equally in production and consumption such as industrial and building 
materials, fuel and power supplies, transport services, information and 
communications equipment, light automobiles and parts, electrical components and 
fittings, furniture, office supplies, and stationery, (3) specialised machinery: goods 
such as industrial and military equipment, often produced in the same industrial 
facilities, that could only be used in production or the defence sector, and (4) military 
services, the specialised task of the armed forces. 
The northeastern square of the table is the inter–industry matrix; for simplicity 
intra–industry transactions are netted out. Column (5) then shows the total 
intermediate demands for each category of product just as row (5) shows total 
intermediate consumption by each sector. 
Second, final uses are set out to the right of the inter–industry matrix in columns 
(6) civilian consumption, (7) civilian investment, and (8) military spending. Civilian 
consumption depended on the wage incomes of households, and investment and 
military spending were the most important aggregates fixed by the state budget. The 
subtotal of these three makes column (8) total final demand or GDP. 
Third, when we add together columns (5) total intermediate demands and (8) total 
final demands we finally reach the level at which the economy was planned, that is 
column (9) the gross output of each sector.  
Proposition 1. Budgetary allocations to defence and investment closed the allocation 
of resources and determined household consumption as a residual. 
This framework defines the role of the state budget as follows. The vector of supply 
plans for gross output 
1
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X
X




 of the material production sphere was not sufficient to 
allocate resources among final uses. This is because it left two things undetermined: 
the allocation of general–purpose products among intermediate and final uses, and the 
allocation of all products to final military use. Budget allocations to final demand 
[ ]I M  closed the system, fixing civilian consumption as a residual. Specifically, 
( ) ( ) ( )21 1 2 23 3 14 24 341 1C X X X I Mα α α α α= − ⋅ + + − ⋅ − − + + ⋅  
i.e. civilian consumption rose with 
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X
 
 
 
 
 and fell as [ ]I M  rose. In words, 
households were able to consume the output of consumables not claimed for military 
services, plus the output of general purpose goods not claimed for production by the 
producers of consumables and machinery or for investment or for military services. 
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Proposition 2. The conscript wage consistent with an overall macroeconomic 
equilibrium was associated positively with supply plans for civilian output, negatively 
with budgetary allocations to defence and investment, negatively with the civilian 
reservation wage, and negatively with the labour intensity of military services output. 
The totals of intermediate inputs shown in row (5) and columns (1) to (4) of table 2 
may be transposed to column (11) and rows (1) to (4) and subtracted from column 
(10) gross output to yield column (12) value added in each sector or its contribution 
to GDP. But value added is divided between wages and profits; this is shown in rows 
(6) and (7). Think of labour inputs multiplied by wage rates to fix the wage bill of 
each sector, leaving profits as a residual. These profits were taxed away to create the 
revenues matching the state budget outlays. The sum of rows (5) to (7) is once again 
row (8) the gross outputs of the economy. 
Suppose that workers in civilian sectors were retained by receipt of a reservation 
wage wR . Military services, on the other hand, were supplied by conscripts who were 
retained by fear of punishment if they left; they were paid a lower conscript wage wC . 
The condition of an equilibrium in the market for consumer goods imposed limits on 
what the authorities could pay their conscripts; on the simplifying assumption that 
households spent all their income the equilibrium conscript wage ˆCw  could be 
defined as follows: 
( ) ( ) ( )21 1 1 2 2 23 3 3 14 24 34
4 4
1 1 1
ˆ R R RC
w X w X w X I
w
M
α λ λ α λ α α α
λ λ
− − + − + − − − + +
= −
 
That is the equilibrium conscript wage was positively associated with supply plans of 
the three civilian sectors but negatively associated with budgetary demands, with the 
civilian reservation wage, and with the labour intensity of military services output.  
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Table 1.1. Soviet Supply Plans and Budget Allocations in an Input–Output Framework 
To: (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)  (12)  
 Specialised 
Consum–
ables 
General 
Purpose 
Goods 
Specialised 
Machinery 
Military 
Services 
Total 
Inter–
mediate 
Demand 
Civilian 
Con–
sumption 
Civilian 
Invest–
ment 
Military 
Outlays 
Total 
Final 
Demand 
Gross 
Output 
Total 
Intermediate 
Inputs 
Value 
Added 
From:             
(1) Specialised Consumables – – – 14 4Xα  A1 C1 – – F1 X1 1 1ii
Xα  V1 
(2) General Purpose Products 21 1Xα  – 23 3Xα  24 4Xα  A2 C2 I2 – F2 X2 – V2 
(3) Specialised Machinery – – – 34 4Xα  A3 – I3 – F3 X3 3 3ii
Xα  V3 
(4) Military Services – – – – – – – M4 F4 X4 4 4i
i
Xα  V4 
(5) Total Intermediate Inputs 1 1i
i
Xα  – 3 3i
i
Xα  4 4i
i
Xα  A – – – – – A – 
(6) Wages 1 1Rw Xλ  2 2Rw Xλ 3 3Rw Xλ  4 4Cw Xλ  – – – – – – – W 
(7) Profits Π1 Π2 Π3 Π4 – – – – – – – Π 
(8) Total Outlays X1 X2 X3 X4 – C I M F X – V 
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Key to Table 1.1 
i
i
X X=  is total gross output of the economy; Xi is gross output of the ith industry and i i iX A F= + . 
i
i
A A=  is total intermediate demand in the economy; Ai is total intermediate demand for output of the ith industry, i ij j
j
A Xα= , and ijα  is the sale of 
output of the ith industry to the jth industry arising from a unit of output of Xj. 
i
i
F F=  is total final demand or national income; Fi is the final demand for output of the ith industry and i i i iF C I M= + + . 
i
i
V V=  is total value added or national income; Vi is value added by the ith industry, i i ji i
j
V X Xα= − , and V = F. 
i
i
C C=  is total final civilian consumption; Ci is the output of the ith industry that is consumed. 
i
i
I I=  is total final civilian investment; Ii is the output of the ith industry that is invested. 
M is total final outlays on military services; M = M4 = F4 = X4 is the output of the armed forces. 
i i i
i
W w Xλ=  is the total wage bill of the economy; iλ  and wi are the labour intensity of gross output and the wage rate in the ith industry respectively. 
i
i
Π Π=  is total profit in the economy; Πi is profit of the ith industry, i i i i iV w XΠ λ= − ; 4 4 4 4w X Vλ =  and Π4 = 0. 
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Appendix 2 
All tables are from Konoplev (1981); all figures are given as in the source unless otherwise noted. 
Table 2.1. Maintenance of the Armed Forces 
 Strategic Missile Forces Ground Forces Air Force Navy 
 
Billion 
Rubles
Per Cent of 
Column 
Total
Billion 
Rubles
Per Cent of 
Column 
Total 
Billion 
Rubles
Per Cent of 
Column 
Total
Billion 
Rubles
Per Cent of 
Column 
Total
Total, 
Billion 
Rubles 
Pay of Service Personnel 20.679 20 18.464 15a 11.698 18 8.508 16 59.349 
Other Wages 5.17 5 3.692 5 2.599 4 3.722 7 15.183 
Food 10.339 10 11.078 15 5.849 9 4.785 9 32.051 
Personal Kit 10.339 10 7.385 10 4.549 7 4.254 8 26.527 
Payment for and Storage of Fuel and 
Flammables 6.203 6 8.862 12 10.398 16 7.976 15 33.439 
Repair of Weapons, Military Equipment, and 
Stores 4.135 4 6.647 9 9.099 14 2.658 5 22.539 
Transport Costs 3.101 3 2.215 3 1.299 2 0 0 6.615 
Power Line Rentals 2.067 2 2.954 4 3.899 6 0 0 8.92 
Maintenance of Space Launch Sites and 
Special–Purpose Ranges, Bases, and Depots 31.019 30 7.385 10 12.998 20 18.611b 35 70.013 
Operational, Business, and Other Costs 10.339 10 5.169 7 2.599 4 2.658 5 20.765 
Column Total 103.391 100 73.851 90 64.987 100 53.172 100 295.401 
Total Given in Source 103.398 .. 73.856 .. 64.993 .. 53.176 .. 295.424 
Notes: a As given in the original; 25 per cent is evidently intended. b “Within the borders of the USSR”. 
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Table 2.2. Procurement of Weapons, Military Equipment, and Stores 
 Strategic Missile Forces Ground Forces Air Force Navy 
 
Billion 
Rubles
Per Cent of 
Column Total
Billion 
Rubles
Per Cent of 
Column Total
Billion 
Rubles
Per Cent of 
Column Total
Billion 
Rubles
Per Cent of 
Column Total
Total,  
Billion 
Rubles 
Munitions 51.699 70 33.235 60 11.715 45 7.088 25 103.737 
Combat Equipment 11.078 15 19.387 35 11.715 45 17.012 50 59.192 
Stores 11.078 15 2.769 5 2.603 10 4.253 15 20.703 
Column Total 73.855 100 55.391 100 26.033 100 28.353 90 183.632 
Total Given in Source 73.856 .. 55.392 .. 26.034 .. 28.354 .. 184.840 
 
 
Table 2.3. Procurement of Scientific and Technical Products 
 Strategic Missile Forces Ground Forces Air Force Navy 
 
Billion 
Rubles
Per Cent of 
Row Total
Billion 
Rubles
Per Cent of 
Row Total 
Billion 
Rubles
Per Cent of 
Row Total
Billion 
Rubles
Per Cent of 
Row Total
Total, 
Billion 
Rubles 
Scientific & Technical Products 29.542 40 7.354 10  22.156 30 14.771 20 73.823 
Total Given in Source .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 73.855 
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Table 2.4. Capital Construction and Capital Repair, and Special–Purpose and Residential Construction 
 Strategic Missile Forces Ground Forces Air Force Navy 
 
Billion 
Rubles
Per Cent of 
Row Total
Billion 
Rubles
Per Cent of 
Row Total
Billion 
Rubles
Per Cent of 
Row Total
Billion 
Rubles
Per Cent of 
Row Total
Total, 
Billion 
Rubles 
Nonresidential Construction 31.412 40 19.463 25 10.899 14 9.342 12 71.116 
Residential Construction .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 7.006 
Column Total .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 78.122 
Total Given in Source (1) .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 77.855 
Total Given in Source (2) .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 73.855 
Note. Total given in source (1) is that given on the same page; (2) is as table 3. 
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Table 2.5. Maintenance of Armed Forces Within the Provisions of the Organisation 
of the Warsaw Treaty and Treaties for Mutual Defence 
 
Billion 
Rubles
Per Cent of 
Column Total
East Germany 11.000 20 
Poland 8.250 15 
Czechoslovakia 8.250 15 
Hungary 4.950 9 
Mongolia 1.650 3 
Bulgaria 3.850 7 
North Korea 0.550 1 
Afghanistan 16.500 30 
Column Total 55.000 100 
Total Given in Source 55.000 ..
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Table 2.6. Maintenance of Soviet Personnel and Establishment of Military Advisers in 
Foreign States Within the Provisions of Treaties for Friendship and Mutual Aid and 
Special–Purpose Agreements 
 
Billion 
Rubles
Per Cent of 
Column Total
Vietnam 0.437 6 
Laos 0.072 1 
India 0.291 4 
South Yemen 0.145 2 
North Yemen 0.291 4 
Ethiopia 0.364 5 
Tanzania 0.145 2 
Zambia 0.072 1 
Mozambique 0.51 7 
Angola 0.582 8 
Madagascar 0.072 1 
Congo 0.072 1 
Nigeria 0.072 1 
Benin 0.072 1 
Mali 0.072 1 
Algeria 0.145 2 
Libya 0.655 9 
Cuba 2.55 35 
Nicaragua 0.582 8 
Peru 0.072 1 
Column Total 7.273 100 
Total Given in Source 7.286 ..
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Table 2.7. Partial Repayment of Rent for Utilisation of Air Force Bases and Foreign 
Ports 
 
Billion 
Rubles
Per Cent of 
Column Total
Vietnam 8.01 18 
North Yemen 6.23 14 
Ethiopia 4.00 9 
Angola 5.79 13 
Syria 1.78 4 
Libya 7.12 16 
Guinea 1.34 3 
Seychelles 1.34 3 
Column Total 35.61 80 
Total Given in Source 44.50 ..
Note. The source states: “the budget was 79% fulfilled”. 
Table 2.8. Maintenance of Special Forces 
 
Billion 
Rubles
Per Cent of 
Column Total
Weapons 0.337 15 
Operational-Technical Means 0.561 25 
Special-Purpose Ranges 0.898 40 
Special-Purpose Equipment 0.449 20 
Column Total 2.245 100 
Total Given in Source (1) 2.244 ..
Total Given in Source (2) 1.477 ..
Note. Total given in source (1) is that given on the same page; (2) is as table 4. 
Table 2.9. Nuclear Weapons and Means of Delivery 
 
Billion 
Rubles
Per Cent of 
Column Total
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles 12.707 35 
Intermediate Range Missiles 9.077 25 
Tactical Missiles 5.446 15 
Air Launched Missiles 3.63 10 
Sea Launched Missiles 3.63 10 
Artillery Shells 1.815 5 
Column Total 36.305 100 
Total Given in Source 36.307 ..
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